FTPShell Client 6.7 is vulnerable to a buffer overflow when processing an FTP 220 response containing 400 characters of 'F'. A malicious FTP server can exploit this by sending an overly long 220 response, causing the client to crash and potentially allowing arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2009-3364 and CVE-2017-6465, which also involve buffer overflows in FTP client/server interactions.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/windows/ftp/ftpshell_cli_bof.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2018-7573) in FTPShell client 6.70 (Enterprise edition) for Windows. The exploit works by running a malicious FTP server that delivers a specially crafted response to the client, triggering the overflow and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module is fully integrated with Metasploit, allowing the attacker to select and deliver a payload of their choice (up to 400 bytes, avoiding certain bad characters). The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports customizable payloads. The only network endpoint involved is the attacker's FTP server, which listens on a configurable IP and port (default 0.0.0.0:21). The repository is structured as a single Ruby file following Metasploit conventions, and its sole purpose is to provide a reliable remote code execution exploit for the specified FTPShell client vulnerability.
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