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A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Comtrend AR-5387un devices running firmware version A731-410JAZ-C04_R02.A2pD035g.d23i. The vulnerability is due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied input in the Service Description parameter when creating a WAN service, allowing remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a Python exploit script (CVE-2018-8062.py) targeting a persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Comtrend AR-5387un router's web management interface (CVE-2018-8062). The exploit automates the process of logging into the router (using default or supplied credentials), navigating the WAN service setup, and injecting a custom JavaScript payload into the 'Service Description' field. The payload is then persistently stored and executed in the context of the router's web interface, affecting any user who views the WAN services page. The script bypasses CSRF protections and allows for custom payloads via command-line arguments. The repository also includes a README with exploitation instructions and a GPL license file. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the router's web interface, typically at http://192.168.1.1/ or a similar local IP. The endpoints targeted are specific CGI scripts and configuration pages on the router. The exploit is a proof-of-concept and does not include advanced payloads or post-exploitation features.
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