Apache Tapestry contains a path traversal vulnerability in the handling of assets under the /assets/ctx path. The issue occurs in the processing chain StaticFilesFilter -> AssetDispatcher -> ContextResource, which does not properly filter the backslash (\) character. On Windows platforms, where backslash is accepted as a path separator, an attacker can use crafted requests to traverse directories and access files outside the intended asset context.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
/assets/ctx endpoint where feasible, especially on Windows deployments. Use web server or reverse proxy rules to block requests containing backslashes or traversal sequences targeting asset paths. Limit filesystem permissions for the application service account so that even if traversal occurs, access to sensitive files is minimized. Monitoring for suspicious requests to /assets/ctx containing \ or traversal patterns may help detect exploitation attempts.Patch, then assume compromise.
No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 2 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.