Loading vulnerability…
SAP Solution Manager Diagnostics Agent (SMDAgent) version 7.2 stores several credentials, including SLD user and Solman user communication credentials, in the SAP Secure Storage file (secstore.properties) without encryption by default. These credentials are only base64-encoded, making them easily decodable by an attacker with administrative privileges on the host. This insecure storage mechanism exposes sensitive configuration credentials to potential compromise if the agent host is breached.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit post-exploitation module (modules/post/multi/sap/smdagent_get_properties.rb) targeting SAP Solution Manager Diagnostics Agent (SMDAgent) systems. The module exploits CVE-2019-0307, which allows retrieval of unencrypted credentials from the secstore.properties file used by the SMDAgent to connect to the SAP Solution Manager server. The module works on multiple platforms (Windows, Linux, Unix, OSX, BSD) and requires an active session (meterpreter or shell) on the target. It locates the relevant configuration directories, reads the secstore.properties and runtime.properties files, extracts credentials and connection details, and stores them in the Metasploit database. The module also reports the discovered service and vulnerability. The main attack vector is local post-exploitation, requiring prior access to the target system. The endpoints of interest are the configuration files containing sensitive information. The code is written in Ruby and is operational, providing real credential extraction and reporting functionality.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.