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A vulnerability in the EAP peer implementation of Espressif ESP-IDF (versions 2.0.0 through 4.0.0) and ESP8266_NONOS_SDK (versions 2.2.0 through 3.1.0) allows the installation of a zero Pairwise Master Key (PMK) after successful EAP authentication. This flaw enables an attacker within radio range to exploit the weak keying material, as the device will accept a zero PMK, undermining the security of the WPA/WPA2 handshake.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for three Wi-Fi vulnerabilities affecting Espressif ESP32 and ESP8266 IoT devices: CVE-2019-12586 (EAP client crash), CVE-2019-12587 (Zero PMK installation/hijack), and CVE-2019-12588 (Beacon frame crash). The structure includes: - Precompiled and source versions of a custom hostapd (hostapd-2.8_binary, hostapd-2.8_source) configured to emulate a malicious access point for triggering the vulnerabilities. - Scripts and firmware for ESP8266/ESP32 clients to test the vulnerabilities (esp_client_test_codes/). - Beacon frame injection tools (beacon_frame_crasher/) in both Arduino (C++) and Python (scapy) for wireless DoS attacks. - All necessary certificates, keys, and configuration files for WPA2-Enterprise EAP testing. The main attack vectors are over Wi-Fi (network/wireless), targeting devices connected to enterprise networks using WPA2-Enterprise. The exploits can cause device hijacking, denial of service (crash/reboot), or forced re-authentication. The repository is well-structured for research and testing, with clear instructions and all required files for reproducing the attacks in a controlled environment.
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