The Canon PRINT application for Android (jp.co.canon.bsd.ad.pixmaprint) version 2.5.5 exposes sensitive data via its ContentProvider component. The application does not properly restrict access to the canon.ij.printer.capability.data, allowing any application on the device to query and retrieve sensitive information such as factory administrator web interface passwords and WPA2-PSK keys.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2019-14339, targeting the Canon PRINT 2.5.5 Android application. The vulnerability is an unprotected exported content provider ('IJPrinterCapabilityProvider') that allows unauthorized access to sensitive printer data, including factory passwords and WPA2-PSK keys. The repository contains: - An Android app (Java source in 'app/src/main/java/cannon/print/pwn/MainActivity.java') that, when run on a device with Canon PRINT installed, queries the vulnerable content provider and displays sensitive information. - A Python script ('poc-scripts/leak.py') that uses ADB to remotely query the same content provider and print extracted data to the console. - A Bash script ('poc-scripts/dos.sh') that triggers a denial-of-service condition in the Canon PRINT app by launching a specific activity via ADB. The exploit requires the target device to have the Canon PRINT 2.5.5 app installed and a supported Canon printer. The main attack vector is local (via a malicious app or ADB), and the key fingerprintable endpoint is the content provider URI 'content://canon.ij.printer.capability.data/'. The repository is structured as a typical Android project with supporting scripts for POC demonstration. The exploit is a POC and does not include weaponized or automated payload delivery.
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