In Total.js CMS 12.0.0, an authenticated user with the widgets privilege can achieve remote command execution (RCE) on the server by creating a widget containing a specially crafted <script total> tag. The backend evaluates this tag, and due to insufficient sandboxing, arbitrary JavaScript code can be executed server-side. Specifically, the payload leverages global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').exec to execute arbitrary system commands.
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/multi/http/totaljs_cms_widget_exec.rb) that exploits a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2019-15954) in Total.js CMS version 12 and below. The exploit targets the widget functionality, allowing an authenticated admin user to inject malicious JavaScript into a widget, which is then evaluated server-side. The module uses Metasploit's command stager to deliver a payload (via wget or curl, depending on the platform) that is executed on the target server, providing remote code execution. The exploit requires valid admin credentials (default 'admin:admin' is tried) and interacts with several HTTP endpoints of the Total.js CMS, including authentication and widget management APIs. The module is weaponized, supporting customizable payloads and automatic cleanup of the malicious widget after exploitation. The code is written in Ruby and is structured according to Metasploit conventions, with clear separation of authentication, exploitation, and cleanup logic.
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