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ThinVNC 1.0b1 contains a directory traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on the server, including the ThinVnc.ini file where authentication credentials are stored in cleartext. The vulnerability exists even when authentication is enabled, due to improper path sanitization and insufficient authentication checks. Attackers can exploit this flaw via crafted HTTP requests to bypass authentication, steal credentials, and gain remote access to the VNC server.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
This repository contains a Python exploit for CVE-2019-17662, a path traversal vulnerability in ThinVNC (TinyVNC) that allows arbitrary file read via crafted HTTP(S) requests. The main file, CVE-2019-17662.py, is a standalone script that takes a target host, port, and optional file path (defaulting to '../ThinVnc.ini') and attempts to retrieve the specified file from the server using a path traversal sequence. If the default ThinVnc.ini file is read, the script extracts and displays credentials (username and password) from its contents. The exploit supports both HTTP and HTTPS, disables SSL verification, and provides user-friendly output. The README.md provides usage instructions and context. No framework is used; the exploit is operational and can be used directly against vulnerable ThinVNC instances.
This repository contains a C-language exploit for CVE-2019-17662, targeting ThinVNC 1.0b1. The exploit leverages a directory traversal vulnerability in the ThinVNC web server, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files, most notably ThinVnc.ini, which stores VNC credentials in cleartext. The code is organized into a standard C project structure with separate include and src directories. The main entry point is src/main.c, which parses command-line arguments for the target URL and optional file name. The exploit constructs a malicious URL (e.g., http://<target>/abc/../../ThinVnc.ini) and uses libcurl to send an HTTP GET request. The response is parsed to extract and print credentials if found. The Makefile automates compilation, and the README provides clear usage instructions. The exploit is operational, providing direct credential extraction from vulnerable ThinVNC servers.
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