A directory traversal vulnerability exists in Xiaomi Mi WiFi R3G devices prior to firmware version 2.28.23-stable. The vulnerability is due to a misconfigured NGINX alias, which allows attackers to read arbitrary files on the device by crafting requests such as api-third-party/download/extdisks../etc/config/account. This flaw enables attackers to bypass authentication and access sensitive files.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides two Python proof-of-concept exploits targeting Xiaomi Mi WiFi routers (R3G, R3A, R4) running firmware before version 2.28.23. The first exploit (arbitrary_file_read_vulnerability.py) leverages a directory traversal vulnerability in the router's NGINX configuration to read arbitrary files (such as /etc/config/account) without authentication. This allows the attacker to reconstruct the login process and obtain a valid session token (stok) for further actions. The second exploit (remote_command_execution_vulnerability.py) uses the obtained stok to upload a crafted tar.gz archive containing a malicious speedtest_urls.xml file. Due to improper input validation, this file enables command injection when the router executes a speed test, resulting in arbitrary shell command execution as root. The output of the command is written to /tmp/1.txt, which can then be retrieved via another HTTP request. The repository also includes a detailed markdown report explaining the vulnerabilities, exploitation process, and remediation steps, as well as a template XML file used in the command injection exploit. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the router's web interface on the local network. The exploits are operational and provide full compromise of the affected device.
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