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CVE-2019-18394 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Ignite Realtime Openfire through version 4.4.2, specifically in FaviconServlet.java. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to send arbitrary HTTP GET requests to internal or external network resources via the /getFavicon endpoint by supplying a crafted host parameter. The full response from the targeted resource is returned to the attacker, enabling further exploitation such as internal network scanning or accessing sensitive services.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This three-file repository contains a standalone Python 3 proof-of-concept for CVE-2019-18394 in Ignite Realtime Openfire. Its sole code file, `cve_2019_18394_poc.py`, uses only the Python standard library and provides `check`, `read`, and `scan` subcommands. It targets the unauthenticated `/getFavicon` servlet, where the attacker-controlled `host` parameter is concatenated into an `http://` URL. By terminating the supplied host with a query string, the tool can place Openfire's hard-coded `/favicon.ico` suffix into a parameter value and request an arbitrary HTTP path. The `check` workflow uses unique cache-busting values, invalid-DNS baselines, servlet-path fingerprinting, and an embedded local HTTP listener to confirm an Openfire-originated callback and whether the target relays the marker body. `read` uses the SSRF primitive to retrieve internal HTTP resources, while `scan` probes configured TCP ports from the target's network perspective. The README documents vulnerable Openfire versions through 4.4.2 and the 4.4.3 `isImage()` mitigation: it withholds ordinary non-image bodies but does not prevent outbound requests or image-shaped/trailing-data disclosure. No external exploitation framework, destructive behavior, persistence, or unrelated payload is present.
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