Loading vulnerability…
Django’s password-reset form improperly handled email addresses whose Unicode case transformation collides with an existing user’s email address. An attacker could submit a suitably crafted colliding address and receive a password-reset token associated with the matched account, permitting account takeover. Affected versions are Django before 1.11.27, 2.2.9, and 3.0.1.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2019-19844, a vulnerability in Django's password reset functionality. The vulnerability arises from improper Unicode normalization of email addresses, allowing an attacker to use a visually similar but distinct Unicode character (such as the dotless 'ı' in 'mıke@example.org') to request a password reset for another user. The repository is structured as a minimal Django project with an 'accounts' app, including custom forms, views, and templates to demonstrate the exploit. The README provides clear setup and exploitation instructions, including how to create a user, run the server, and perform the attack. The main attack vector is via the web interface at '/accounts/password-reset/'. The codebase is primarily Python, with supporting HTML templates and configuration files. This PoC does not include a weaponized payload but demonstrates the exploit's feasibility in a controlled environment.
This repository is a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2019-19844, a vulnerability in Django 3.0's password reset functionality. The exploit demonstrates how a malformed email address (using a Turkish 'ı' character) can bypass email validation, potentially leading to security issues in password reset workflows. The repository is structured as a minimal Django project with an 'accounts' app, custom password reset form, and templates to facilitate the demonstration. The main exploit capability is to send a password reset request with a malformed email, which is accepted due to the vulnerability. The PoC is intended for local testing using Docker and Docker Compose, and does not include weaponized payloads or automation for exploitation beyond the demonstration. Key endpoints include the password reset URL at http://localhost:8000/accounts/password-reset and the associated email templates. The code is primarily in Python, with supporting configuration in YAML and Dockerfile formats.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.