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A use-after-free vulnerability exists in the ProxyResolverV8::SetPacScript function in proxy_resolver_v8.cc in Android. The flaw allows memory corruption when a freed object is accessed, potentially enabling remote code execution. The vulnerability affects Android versions 8.0, 8.1, 9, and 10.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2019-2205, a critical use-after-free vulnerability in the Android system. The exploit is implemented as an Android application (PacTest.apk) and a malicious Proxy Auto-Config (PAC) file (exploit.pac). The repository is structured as a standard Android Studio project, with Java source code for the app and a standalone JavaScript PAC file. The exploit works by instructing the user to install the PacTest.apk on a vulnerable Android device and configure the device's proxy settings to use a PAC file hosted over HTTP. The PAC file, when processed by the Android system, leverages the vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. Specifically, it uses JavaScript to manipulate memory and trigger the vulnerability, ultimately executing a shell command that spawns a shell listening on TCP port 4444. Key files: - PacTest/app/src/main/java/com/nowsecure/PacTest/MainActivity.java: Main logic for interacting with the Android proxy service and setting up the exploit conditions. - exploit.pac: The malicious PAC file containing the JavaScript exploit and payload. The exploit requires the attacker to host the PAC file on an HTTP server and the victim to configure their device to use it. If successful, the attacker gains a shell on the device. The repository is a functional PoC and not a detection script.
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