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CVE-2019-3799 is a directory traversal vulnerability in the spring-cloud-config-server module of Spring Cloud Config. Affected versions are 2.1.x prior to 2.1.2, 2.0.x prior to 2.0.4, 1.4.x prior to 1.4.6, and older unsupported versions. The flaw allows attacker-controlled request path elements to influence which configuration resource is resolved and served by the Config Server. By sending a specially crafted URL, an attacker can traverse directories and cause the application to return arbitrary configuration files accessible to the server process, rather than only intended configuration resources.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module that exploits a directory traversal vulnerability (CVE-2019-3799) in Spring Cloud Config Server. The module targets unauthenticated endpoints on the server (default port 8888) and allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem by sending a specially crafted HTTP GET request with a path traversal sequence. The module is configurable for the file path and traversal depth, with '/etc/passwd' as the default target file. The exploit is operational and can be used to extract sensitive files from vulnerable Spring Cloud Config Server instances. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit module, making it easy to use within the Metasploit framework.
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