CVE-2019-6260 is an improper isolation vulnerability in ASPEED AST2400 and AST2500 Baseboard Management Controller hardware and firmware. Several Advanced High-performance Bus bridge and debug mechanisms permit arbitrary reads and writes to the BMC physical address space without authentication. Affected mechanisms include iLPC2AHB bridge variants, PCIe VGA and BMC P2A bridges, X-DMA transfers, the UART-based SoC Debug interface, LPC2AHB, and watchdog setup.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a comprehensive C-based toolset for probing, testing, and manipulating ASPEED BMC (Baseboard Management Controller) hardware via multiple low-level interfaces. It is not a simple proof-of-concept but a mature, operational tool that can be used for both security testing and exploitation of BMCs, particularly those based on ASPEED AST2400, AST2500, and AST2600 chips. **Capabilities:** - Probes for available hardware interfaces (PCIe P2A, iLPC2AHB, LPC2AHB, Debug UART, X-DMA, /dev/mem) and their security posture (e.g., write filters, access permissions). - Reads and writes arbitrary physical memory addresses on the BMC via these interfaces. - Dumps or reflashes BMC firmware and RAM, including live systems. - Replaces memory contents (RAM) with arbitrary data, enabling in-memory patching or exploitation. - Resets the SoC or prevents system resets (useful for persistent access or DoS). - Interacts with the BMC console, including automated login and getty spawning via UART or networked serial concentrators (e.g., Digi Portserver TS 16). - Supports both local (direct hardware) and remote (networked serial) attack vectors. - Provides a modular command-line interface with subcommands for each function (see `doit.c` and README for usage). **Structure:** - The main entry point is `doit.c`, which dispatches to various command modules (e.g., `cmd/read.c`, `cmd/write.c`, `cmd/console.c`, etc.). - Hardware interface abstraction is provided via modules for AHB, LPC, PCIe, UART, and memory-mapped IO. - The tool is portable across x86_64, powerpc64, and armv6 architectures, with architecture-specific code in `arch/`. - Includes a number of utility and support libraries (e.g., for logging, prompts, type checking, etc.). **Purpose:** - Designed for security researchers, firmware developers, and platform security testers to assess the security of ASPEED BMC implementations. - Can be used to exploit insecure BMC configurations (e.g., default-unprotected AHB access, missing write filters) to gain arbitrary code execution, dump secrets, or modify firmware. **Notable Endpoints:** - `/dev/mem` (direct memory access) - `/sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/lpc` (LPC interface) - PCI device files in `/sys/bus/pci/devices/` - Network endpoints for Digi Portserver TS 16 (e.g., `<IP>:23`, `<IP>:2104`) - `/sbin/agetty` (for console access) **Security Impact:** - If used against a vulnerable BMC, this tool can provide full control over the BMC, including persistent firmware modification, memory exfiltration, and system disruption. - The tool is operational and weaponizable, as it automates many steps required for exploitation and supports both local and remote attack surfaces.
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2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.