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HP Support Assistant 8.7.50 and earlier contains a vulnerability that allows a local user to gain SYSTEM-level privileges and perform unauthorized modification of directories or files. The specific vulnerable function or code path is not provided in the available content. The issue is explicitly distinct from CVE-2019-6328. Based on the available information, this is a local privilege escalation flaw in HP Support Assistant that can also be used to alter filesystem objects without authorization.
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This repository contains a fully operational local privilege escalation exploit targeting HP Support Assistant (version 8.7.50.3) on Windows 10 64-bit, specifically CVE-2019-6329. The exploit leverages a vulnerability in the way HP Support Assistant's service modifies permissions on .xml files in a specific log directory. By creating a hardlink from a .xml file in this directory to a privileged DLL (hputils64.dll), the attacker can trick the service into granting full permissions on the DLL. The exploit then overwrites this DLL with a malicious payload (MalDll.dll), which is subsequently loaded by a SYSTEM process, resulting in arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM. The repository includes Python (PrivHP4.py) as the main exploit orchestrator, C++ code for process and DLL manipulation, and C# code for interacting with the HP service. The exploit demonstrates successful privilege escalation by launching notepad.exe as SYSTEM. The structure is well-documented, with each component serving a specific role in the attack chain. No network endpoints are involved; the attack is purely local and requires code execution on the target machine.
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