CVE-2019-7194 is an external control of file name or path vulnerability in QNAP Photo Station. According to the provided content, the flaw allows a remote attacker to access or modify system files by supplying attacker-controlled file names or paths to the vulnerable application. The issue affects QNAP Photo Station and is described as a remotely exploitable path handling weakness rather than a local-only flaw.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/gather/qnap_lfi.rb) targeting QNAP QTS and Photo Station installations vulnerable to Local File Inclusion (LFI) (CVE-2019-7192, CVE-2019-7194, CVE-2019-7195). The module allows unauthenticated attackers to download arbitrary files from the QNAP filesystem by exploiting vulnerable HTTP endpoints. The exploit works by first retrieving an album ID and access code from the Photo Station API, then sending a crafted POST request to the /photo/p/api/video.php endpoint with a path traversal payload to read files such as /etc/shadow. If /etc/shadow is retrieved, the module parses and stores password hashes in the Metasploit database. The code is written in Ruby and leverages Metasploit's HttpClient and credential storage features. The attack vector is network-based, requiring only HTTP access to the target device. The module is operational and provides credential extraction functionality if the targeted file is /etc/shadow.
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3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
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