Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2019-8389 is a directory traversal vulnerability in the Wi-Fi transfer feature of Musicloud 1.6. The application exposes a transfer service on port 8080, accessible to anyone on the same Wi-Fi network. By sending crafted POST parameters (downfiles and cur-folder) with directory traversal sequences (../) to the download.script endpoint, an attacker can cause the application to create a MusicPlayerArchive.zip archive containing arbitrary files from the filesystem, such as /etc/passwd, which is then publicly accessible.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2019-8389, a local file read vulnerability in Musicloud for iOS v1.6. The exploit is implemented in a single Python script (CVE-2019-8389.py) that targets the Wi-Fi transfer feature of the Musicloud app, which runs a web service on port 8080. By sending a crafted POST request to the /download.script endpoint with directory traversal payloads, the attacker can cause the service to create a ZIP archive containing the contents of any file on the device. The script then retrieves this archive via a GET request to /MusicPlayerArchive.zip and displays the contents of the targeted file (e.g., /etc/passwd). The repository also includes a README.md file with a detailed description of the vulnerability, affected product/version, and usage instructions. The exploit requires network access to the target device and is a proof-of-concept for arbitrary file read via directory traversal.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.