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A vulnerability in PuTTY for Windows versions prior to 0.71 allows local attackers to hijack the application by placing a malicious help file in the same directory as the PuTTY executable. When the user invokes the help function, PuTTY loads the local help file, which can be replaced by an attacker with a malicious file, leading to arbitrary code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository demonstrates a proof-of-concept exploit for a vulnerability in PuTTY (up to version 0.70) on Windows, where the application loads a CHM help file from the same directory as the executable. The exploit involves creating a malicious CHM file (putty.chm) containing an HTML file (putty.htm) with an embedded OBJECT that triggers PowerShell to download and execute a remote payload (e.g., a Meterpreter reverse shell). The README.md provides detailed instructions for creating the malicious CHM using Microsoft's HTML Help Workshop, including the necessary HTML and PowerShell code. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to place the malicious CHM file in a directory from which the victim runs PuTTY. The repository includes the project file (putty.hhp) and the malicious HTML (putty.htm) used in the CHM. No hardcoded remote URLs are present; the user is instructed to supply their own payload URL.
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