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A confused deputy vulnerability exists in the onCreateSliceProvider method of KeyguardSliceProvider.java in Android 10. The flaw is due to improper handling of PendingIntent, which can be abused to perform actions as the System UI process. This allows a local attacker to escalate privileges without requiring user interaction.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept Android application exploiting CVE-2020-0114, a vulnerability in the SystemUI slice provider on Android. The main exploit logic is implemented in 'app/src/main/java/com/example/cve_2020_0114_systemui/MainActivity.java'. The app constructs a malicious bundle targeting the 'content://com.android.systemui.keyguard' content provider, abuses the slice API to obtain a PendingIntent, and then sends a CALL_PRIVILEGED intent to dial 911 without user interaction. This demonstrates unauthorized access to privileged actions via the SystemUI slice interface. The repository is structured as a standard Android Studio project, with build scripts, resources, and test stubs. The exploit is local (requires app installation) and targets vulnerable Android devices prior to the patch for CVE-2020-0114.
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