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A command injection vulnerability exists in Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP) through version 0.9.8-26, specifically in the backup listing endpoint. The vulnerability arises from the use of 'eval' on user-controlled data (filenames) within the v-list-user-backup script, which is executed with root privileges. An attacker with access to a user account can manipulate a filename (e.g., via FTP) to inject shell metacharacters, which are later executed as root when the backup listing feature is triggered. This is a second-order RCE, as the payload is injected via a filename and executed in a later process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/vestacp_exec.rb) that exploits an authenticated command injection vulnerability (CVE-2020-10808) in the Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP) for Linux. The exploit requires valid credentials for the VestaCP web interface and FTP service. The attack works by uploading a specially crafted file (with a payload in its name) via FTP, then triggering a backup process through the web interface, which causes the vulnerable bash script to execute the payload as root. The module sets up an HTTP server to deliver a second-stage payload (typically a Python Meterpreter reverse shell), resulting in full remote code execution as root. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be used within the Metasploit framework, supporting customizable payloads and automated cleanup. The main attack vectors are HTTP(S) and FTP network services exposed by the target VestaCP instance. The module is weaponized, providing a reliable and automated exploitation process.
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