CVE-2020-10883 is a command injection vulnerability in the tdpServer daemon of TP-Link Archer A7/C7 (AC1750) routers, hardware version 5, firmware version 190726. The flaw exists in the OneMesh service, specifically in the onemesh_slave_key_offer() function, where the 'slave_mac' field from a JSON payload is unsafely copied into a system command executed by system() without proper sanitization. This allows unauthenticated attackers on the LAN to execute arbitrary commands as root via specially crafted AES-encrypted UDP packets. The router's writable root filesystem further facilitates exploitation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby file) that exploits an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in the tdpServer daemon of TP-Link Archer A7/C7 (AC1750) routers (hardware v5, firmware up to 201029/201030). The exploit works over the LAN by sending specially crafted UDP packets to port 20002, allowing arbitrary command execution as root without authentication. The module can deliver a MIPSBE reverse shell payload or execute arbitrary commands/binaries on the target. It includes a version check mechanism that fingerprints the router's firmware via HTTP requests to specific manifest files. The exploit is weaponized, providing reliable remote code execution and is part of the Metasploit framework. The only code file is the exploit module itself, written in Ruby.
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