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CVE-2020-12753 is a vulnerability in the bootloader of LG mobile devices running Android OS versions 7.2, 8.0, 8.1, 9, and 10. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of raw_resources during the boot process, specifically in the context of EL1/EL3 coldboot. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code at a highly privileged level during device boot, potentially compromising the entire device security model.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-12753, targeting the LG Stylo 4 (AMZ/Q710ULM) smartphone running updates 20a or 20c. The exploit leverages a vulnerability in the SBL1 bootloader to achieve arbitrary code execution at Secure EL3, the highest privilege level on ARM devices. The repository contains: - `lg-craftres.py`: A Python script that takes the original raw_resources partition image and a payload (payload.bin), and outputs a modified partition image (raw_resources_a_mod.img) with the exploit payload injected into the LGE_PM_NO_CHARGER resource entry. - `sbl_rop.s`: Assembly source for the ROP chain and shellcode payload, which is assembled into payload.bin. The payload demonstrates code execution by printing a message and performing privileged operations in Secure EL3. - `sbl_gadgets.s`: Assembly definitions for ROP gadgets used in the exploit. - `README.md`: Documentation describing the exploit, build process, and usage. The exploit requires the attacker to flash the modified partition to the device, making the attack vector local (physical or firmware update access required). The main fingerprintable endpoints are the partition image files and the specific resource entry (LGE_PM_NO_CHARGER) that is overwritten. The exploit is a proof-of-concept and demonstrates the vulnerability by executing code and printing a message from Secure EL3.
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