Loading vulnerability…
A time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in PulseSecureService.exe in Pulse Secure Client for Windows versions prior to 9.1.6 (down to 5.3 R70). The service, running as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM, allows unprivileged users to exploit a race condition to execute a Microsoft Installer (MSI) executable with SYSTEM privileges, leading to local privilege escalation.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit for CVE-2020-13162, a privilege escalation vulnerability in Pulse Secure Windows Client versions prior to 9.1.6. The exploit is written in C++ and is designed to be compiled as a 32-bit binary using Visual Studio 2015. The main exploit logic is likely implemented in 'tu-TOCTOU-kaiù-TOCMEU.cpp' (not shown, but referenced in the project files), with supporting code in 'FileOpLock.cpp' and 'FileOpLock.h' to handle opportunistic file locking (oplock) and race condition timing. The exploit works by placing a malicious MSI file ('evil.msi') and the legitimate 'PulseSecureInstallerService.exe' in the same directory as the compiled exploit binary. When executed, the exploit leverages a TOCTOU race condition in the Pulse Secure installer service to execute the attacker's MSI with elevated privileges, resulting in local privilege escalation. The repository is structured as a standard Visual Studio C++ project, with source, header, and project configuration files. No network endpoints are involved; the attack vector is local, targeting file system operations and Windows services.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.