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MyLittleAdmin 3.8 contains a hardcoded machineKey in web.config that is shared across customer installations. A remote attacker can use the known key to submit serialized ASP code to the management tool, resulting in arbitrary code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a .NET ViewState deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2020-13166) in myLittleAdmin for SQL Server, commonly deployed as part of the Plesk web hosting control panel (notably Plesk Obsidian). The exploit leverages hardcoded <machineKey> values in the web.config file to sign arbitrary ViewState payloads, enabling pre-authentication remote code execution as the service user (IUSRPLESK_sqladmin). The module supports multiple payload types, including direct command execution, PowerShell stagers, and Meterpreter reverse shells. The default attack vector is network-based, targeting the myLittleAdmin web interface (typically on port 8401 over HTTPS). The module is operational and weaponized, providing reliable exploitation with customizable payloads. The only file in the repository is a Ruby script structured according to Metasploit conventions, with clear separation of check and exploit logic, and options for target URI and port configuration.
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