TeamViewer Desktop for Windows before version 15.8.3 fails to properly quote its custom URI handlers. This allows a malicious website to invoke TeamViewer with arbitrary parameters via specially crafted links (e.g., teamviewer10: --play URL). This can be exploited to coerce the victim's system into sending NTLM authentication requests, which can then be relayed or the hash captured for offline password cracking. The vulnerability affects multiple TeamViewer protocol handlers, including teamviewer10, teamviewer8, teamviewerapi, tvchat1, tvcontrol1, tvfiletransfer1, tvjoinv8, tvpresent1, tvsendfile1, tvsqcustomer1, tvsqsupport1, tvvideocall1, and tvvpn1.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module that exploits CVE-2020-13699, a vulnerability in the TeamViewer URI handler on Windows. The exploit targets TeamViewer versions prior to several fixed releases and is effective only when the victim uses Firefox as their browser. The module sets up a malicious HTTP server that serves an HTML page with two iframes, each triggering the TeamViewer URI handler with a specially crafted argument. This causes the victim's TeamViewer client to attempt an SMB connection to an attacker-controlled server, potentially leaking NTLM credentials or enabling SMB relay attacks. The module is configurable with the SMB server IP, the TeamViewer URI handler type, and the file path to request. The exploit is operational and requires the attacker to run an SMB capture/relay tool to collect or relay the victim's credentials. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit module.
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