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CVE-2020-23349 is an intent redirection vulnerability in Sina Weibo Android SDK version 4.2.7, specifically in the com.sina.weibo.sdk.share.WbShareTransActivity component. The vulnerability allows this activity to start any unexported Activity within the application, bypassing intended access controls.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a small Android lab project that reproduces CVE-2020-23349 as a local privilege-bypass / intent-redirection issue in Sina Weibo Android SDK 4.2.7. It is not a remote exploit or malware family; it is an educational proof-of-concept consisting of two Android apps: `victim` and `attacker`. Repository structure: the root contains standard Gradle project files (`build.gradle`, `settings.gradle`, wrapper scripts/properties). The `victim` module is an Android app that includes the vulnerable `openDefault-4.2.7.aar` SDK and declares `com.sina.weibo.sdk.share.WbShareTransActivity` as exported in its manifest for deterministic reproduction on modern Android. It also contains `PrivateActivity`, explicitly marked `android:exported="false"`, which serves as the protected target. The `attacker` module is a separate Android app with a single `MainActivity` that builds a crafted explicit Intent and launches the victim’s exported Weibo SDK activity. Main exploit capability: `attacker/.../MainActivity.java` sets the component to victim package `lab.cve202023349.victim` and class `com.sina.weibo.sdk.share.WbShareTransActivity`, then populates both vulnerable extras, `startActivity` and `gotoActivity`, with `lab.cve202023349.victim.PrivateActivity`. According to the README, the vulnerable SDK trusts these external string values and internally performs `resultIntent.setClassName(this, startActivityName); startActivity(resultIntent);`. Because `this` is the victim app context, Android treats the launch as originating from the victim itself, allowing the non-exported activity to open. Observed result: successful exploitation displays the `EXPLOIT SUCCESS` screen from `PrivateActivity`, proving unauthorized access to a private component and exposing a dummy secret string (`LAB-SECRET-23349`). Attack surface and scope: the attack vector is local Android inter-app communication via explicit Intents. No network communication, C2, persistence, or post-exploitation logic is present. The code is a straightforward PoC with a fixed target package/class and no payload customization beyond the hardcoded activity names.
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