Loading vulnerability…
In AppImage libappimage versions prior to 1.0.3, an attacker can craft a malicious .desktop file with a Name= field containing path components. When processed, this can cause the application to overwrite a system-installed .desktop file, potentially leading to privilege escalation or execution of arbitrary code when the overwritten .desktop file is subsequently used.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2020-25265 and CVE-2020-25266, targeting vulnerabilities in libappimage (<1.0.3) and appimaged on Linux systems. The exploit demonstrates how a specially crafted MP3 file can be used to override a system-installed application (Nautilus) by abusing how appimaged scans files and how libappimage handles desktop entry names. The repository contains: - A Pascal payload (payload.pas) that, when executed, sends a notification and launches Nautilus. - A Dart script (write_mp3.dart) that automates the creation of the malicious MP3 file (target.mp3) by embedding the payload, the original audio, and a SquashFS filesystem containing a rogue desktop entry (nautilus.desktop) and icon (nautilus.svg). - The nautilus.desktop file is crafted to overwrite the legitimate Nautilus desktop entry in the user's local applications directory, causing the attacker's payload to be executed when Nautilus is launched. - The exploit requires the user to have appimaged running and a vulnerable version of libappimage. The attack vector is local, as it relies on the user placing the crafted MP3 in a directory scanned by appimaged. The repository is structured as a PoC and does not include weaponized or highly automated attack capabilities, but it clearly demonstrates the exploitation process and the impact of the vulnerabilities.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.