An unrestricted file upload issue in FlexDotnetCMS before v1.5.9 allows an authenticated remote attacker to upload and execute arbitrary files by using the FileManager to upload malicious code (e.g., ASP code) in the form of a safe file type (e.g., a TXT file), and then using the FileEditor (in v1.5.8 and prior) or the FileManager's rename function (in v1.5.7 and prior) to rename the file to an executable extension (e.g., ASP), and finally executing the file via an HTTP GET request to /<path_to_file>.
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby file) that exploits an arbitrary file upload vulnerability (CVE-2020-27386) in FlexDotnetCMS v1.5.8 and prior, running on Windows. The exploit requires valid credentials for a user with FileManager permissions. The module authenticates to the CMS, uploads a TXT file, and then uses the file editor to rename it to an ASP file containing a customizable payload (default: Meterpreter reverse shell). The payload is then executed via a direct HTTP request. The module also includes cleanup functionality to remove uploaded files. The attack vector is network-based, targeting the web interface of FlexDotnetCMS. The code is weaponized, leveraging Metasploit's payload generation and session management capabilities. All endpoints and actions are performed over HTTP requests to the target CMS instance.
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