A flaw exists in the check_chunk_name() function of pngcheck version 2.4.0. The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious PNG file that, when processed by pngcheck, can trigger a temporary denial of service condition. The issue is due to improper input validation within the check_chunk_name() function.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a comprehensive set of proof-of-concept (POC) exploits for multiple vulnerabilities in the pngcheck utility (versions 2.4.0, 3.0.0, and 3.0.1), including CVE-2020-27818 and CVE-2020-35511. The structure is organized by vulnerability and version, with each subdirectory containing a README, a Python script to generate malicious PNG or MNG files, and references to the vulnerabilities. The main exploit capability is the generation of crafted image files that, when processed by vulnerable versions of pngcheck, trigger out-of-bounds reads, buffer over-reads, or null pointer dereferences, leading to application crashes or denial of service. The exploits are local in nature, requiring the attacker to convince a user or process to analyze a malicious file with pngcheck. The repository does not contain weaponized or remote exploits, but provides high-quality POC scripts and detailed documentation for each vulnerability. No network endpoints or remote services are targeted; all attacks are file-based. The code is primarily in Python, with one patch file for enabling AddressSanitizer. The repository is well-structured for vulnerability research and testing.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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