Loading vulnerability…
Macally WIFISD2-2A82 Media and Travel Router firmware 2.000.010 contains an authorization flaw in the Guest user's password-reset process. A Guest user can exploit the process to take over the administrator account and obtain shell access. The administrator account can read the system password-hash file, allowing extraction of hashes for all users, including root; cracking the root hash results in complete system compromise.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a Python exploit (macally_exploit.py) and a detailed README for CVE-2020-29669, targeting the Macally WIFISD2-2A82 Travel Router (firmware 2.000.010). The exploit leverages a vulnerability in the password reset functionality accessible to the guest user, allowing privilege escalation to admin and ultimately root. The script automates the attack: it authenticates as guest via HTTP, resets the admin password, logs in as admin via Telnet, dumps the /etc/shadow file, cracks the root password (using a hardcoded value or hashcat), and finally spawns a root shell via Telnet. The README provides a step-by-step walkthrough, including screenshots and context. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the router's web interface and Telnet service. The endpoints involved are HTTP POST requests to /protocol.csp and Telnet access to the device. The exploit is operational, providing full system compromise from a guest account.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.