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Tenda N300 F3 devices running firmware version 12.01.01.48 are vulnerable to an information disclosure flaw. Remote attackers can directly request the cgi-bin/DownloadCfg/RouterCfm.cfg file, potentially retrieving sensitive configuration data, including the http_passwd value. The vulnerability is related to improper access control on configuration file endpoints, similar to CVE-2017-14942. The exploitability may depend on specific request formatting, such as appending a '?' to the filename or using non-standard HTTP headers, though the exact mechanism is unclear.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a Python exploit tool targeting the Tenda F3 router (v3/v4) vulnerable to CVE-2020-35391. The main script, tendaF3-tool.py, allows an unauthenticated attacker to download sensitive files from the router by sending crafted HTTP GET requests to specific endpoints: /cgi-bin/DownloadCfg (configuration file), /cgi-bin/DownloadSyslog (system log), and /cgi-bin/DownloadFlash (flash memory dump). The tool can also extract and decode the admin username and password from the downloaded configuration file. The repository includes a README with usage instructions and a LICENSE file. The exploit is operational and provides direct access to sensitive router data without authentication, making it a practical tool for exploiting this vulnerability.
This repository provides a Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-35391, targeting Tenda N300 F3 routers (firmware 12.01.01.48 and earlier). The exploit is implemented in a single script, main.py, which takes the target router's IP address as a command-line argument. It establishes a raw TCP connection to port 80 and sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the endpoint /cgi-bin/DownloadCfg/RouterCfm.cfg. If the router is vulnerable, it responds with a configuration file containing a base64-encoded administrative password (http_passwd), which the script extracts and decodes. The repository includes standard project files (README, LICENSE, .gitignore, and a GitHub Actions workflow for linting), but the core exploit logic resides entirely in main.py. The exploit demonstrates an authentication bypass vulnerability, allowing remote attackers to retrieve sensitive configuration data from affected routers.
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