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CVE-2020-36762 is a critical vulnerability in ONS Digital RAS Collection Instrument up to version 2.0.27. The vulnerability resides in the 'jobs' function of the GitHub Actions workflow file '.github/workflows/comment.yml', where improper handling of the $COMMENT_BODY argument allows for OS command injection. This enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system running the workflow.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This 70-file repository is a Python 3.8 Flask microservice snapshot, accompanied by Docker Compose, Helm/Kubernetes deployment templates, Alembic database migrations, OpenAPI/Swagger documentation, and unit tests. Its normal application role is to accept authenticated collection-instrument and survey-response uploads, encrypt stored SEFT instrument data with AES-CBC, persist metadata/files in PostgreSQL, query internal case/collection-exercise/party/survey APIs using HTTP Basic authentication, and publish collection-instrument or encrypted survey-response messages to RabbitMQ exchanges/queues (Seft.Instruments and Seft.Responses). Exposed application routes are registered in run.py under /collection-instrument-api/1.0.2 and /survey_response-api/v1, with /info unauthenticated. The security-relevant artifact is .github/workflows/comment.yml. Its issue_comment-triggered deployment job runs whenever a comment merely contains '/deploy'. It expands the fully attacker-controlled comment body directly in a shell `echo` command without quoting or safe environment passing, before extracting the requested namespace. Shell metacharacters in that body can therefore cause command execution on the Actions runner. The job subsequently authenticates to Google Cloud using GCR_KEY, invokes GitHub's API with BOT_TOKEN, and publishes a Spinnaker deployment event, making the workflow a supply-chain/cloud-CI command-injection proof of concept rather than a conventional network exploit. The README explicitly identifies the repository as an automated research snapshot reproducing a published GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability and states that its secrets are dummy values. No CVE identifier, self-contained exploit launcher, fixed malicious command, persistence mechanism, or reverse-shell payload is supplied. Repository archive size was not provided in the source data, so size_bytes is recorded as 0.
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