Loading vulnerability…
GLPI versions before 9.4.6 use GLPIKEY, a public default encryption key shared across installations, to encrypt sensitive stored data. Because the key is publicly known and reused, an attacker who obtains ciphertext encrypted with this key can decrypt the protected data. Replacing the key on existing installations requires re-encrypting affected database values; unidentified encrypted fields, particularly those introduced by plugins, complicate this process.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-5248, a vulnerability in GLPI (prior to version 9.4.6) where a default, public encryption key ('GLPI£i'snarss'ç') is used for sensitive data. The repository contains two files: a README.md explaining the vulnerability and usage, and a PHP script (decrypt_any.php) that implements the decryption logic. The PHP script defines a function 'decrypt' that takes a base64-encoded string (representing encrypted data from GLPI) and decrypts it using the default key. The user is instructed to replace the placeholder string in the script with the actual encrypted data they wish to decrypt. This exploit demonstrates that any attacker with access to encrypted data from a vulnerable GLPI instance can decrypt it, exposing sensitive information such as passwords. No network endpoints or remote attack vectors are present; the exploit is local and requires access to the encrypted data.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.