Cayin CMS contains an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the 'NTP_Server_IP' HTTP POST parameter of the system.cgi page. Attackers with access to the application (including via default credentials) can inject arbitrary shell commands, which are executed as the root user. The vulnerability affects multiple versions and branches, including CME-SE, CMS-60, CMS-40, CMS-20, and CMS versions 8.2, 8.0, and 7.5.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/cayin_cms_ntp.rb) that exploits an authenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Cayin CMS versions 11.0 and below (CVE-2020-7357). The exploit targets the 'ntpIp' parameter in the 'system_service.cgi' endpoint, which is vulnerable to command injection. The module requires valid credentials to log in to the CMS and is designed for systems running on Ubuntu 16.04. The exploit achieves root-level code execution by sending crafted HTTP POST requests to the vulnerable endpoint, using Metasploit's CmdStager to deliver and execute a payload (defaulting to a Meterpreter reverse shell). The module includes detection logic to verify the presence of Cayin CMS and handles authentication, command execution, and payload staging. The only file in the repository is the Metasploit module itself, written in Ruby, and it is fully operational for exploitation within the Metasploit framework.
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