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CVE-2020-8004 refers to an incorrect access control vulnerability in STMicroelectronics STM32F1 microcontroller devices. The flaw allows unauthorized access to certain device resources or functions due to insufficient enforcement of access restrictions.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-8004, targeting STMicroelectronics STM32F1 microcontrollers. The exploit leverages a hardware vulnerability that allows bypassing the device's readout protection by manipulating exception handling through the debug interface (SWD/JTAG) using OpenOCD. The main components are: - `stm32f1-firmware-extractor/main.py`: The primary exploit script, written in Python, which connects to an OpenOCD server (default: localhost:6666) and orchestrates the memory extraction process by generating specific exceptions on the target device. - `stm32f1-firmware-extractor/openocd.py`: A Python library for communicating with OpenOCD via its Tcl interface, used by the main exploit script. - `stm32f1-firmware-extractor/firmware/main.c` and `Makefile`: Example firmware and build instructions for the STM32F1 device, used to demonstrate the exploit. - `.gitmodules`: References an external OpenOCD toolbox for additional scripts. The exploit requires physical or logical access to the debug interface of the target STM32F1 device and a running OpenOCD instance. It does not provide a weaponized or automated attack, but demonstrates the vulnerability and extraction process. The repository is structured as a typical PoC, with clear separation between exploit logic, firmware example, and OpenOCD communication utilities.
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