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Pulse Secure Desktop Client versions 9.0Rx before 9.0R5 and 9.1Rx before 9.1R4 on Windows stored user credentials (including domain credentials) encrypted in the Windows registry using DPAPI with predictable entropy. This allowed attackers with user-level access to extract and decrypt saved credentials without privilege escalation. The vulnerability was addressed by moving encryption to a SYSTEM-level service and using a hardcoded entropy value only accessible by SYSTEM, thus requiring SYSTEM privileges to recover credentials.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit post-exploitation module: 'Windows Pulse Secure Connect Client Saved Password Extractor'. The module is written in Ruby and is designed to be run on a Windows system via a Meterpreter session. Its primary purpose is to extract and decrypt saved VPN credentials (passwords) from the Pulse Secure Connect Client by accessing and decrypting data stored in the Windows Registry and specific files (such as 'connstore.dat' and '[SID].dat'). If the session is running as SYSTEM, it can also associate passwords with usernames. The module leverages Windows DPAPI for decryption and checks the installed version of the Pulse Secure client to determine vulnerability. The code references CVE-2020-8956 and is operational, providing real credential extraction capabilities. The main attack vector is local post-exploitation, requiring prior access to the target system.
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