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projen NodeProject-derived projects generated a GitHub Actions rebuild workflow that processed pull-request comments through the issue_comment event. Because this event runs with the target repository’s GITHUB_TOKEN rather than a fork-scoped token, an untrusted GitHub user could cause untrusted pull-request code to execute in the main repository context. In repositories without default-branch protection, this could enable modification of the main repository and access to repository-configured secrets.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is a 100-file TypeScript/JavaScript snapshot of projen v0.16.40, presented as a research artifact reproducing a historical GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability. It is not a conventional standalone exploit binary: the vulnerable/exploitable component is `.github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml`. The repository otherwise contains project-generator configuration (`.projenrc.js`, package metadata, task definitions), a Node CLI launcher (`bin/projen` and `projen.bash`), documentation, licensing templates, and Jest-based TypeScript tests. The key workflow is triggered by an `issue_comment` event when a PR comment contains `@projen rebuild`. It queries the pull request URL, extracts `head.ref` and `head.repo.full_name`, checks out that PR head (including a fork), then executes `yarn install`, project synthesis, and a full build before committing and pushing. Because `issue_comment` workflows execute in the base repository context, this creates a privileged pull-request build pattern: untrusted fork code can run before the workflow pushes changes and while any context-authorized token/secrets are available. The supplied README states this is a disposable, historical reproduction and that included secrets/variables are generated dummy values. No CVE identifier or hard-coded exfiltration endpoint/payload is present.
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