CVE-2021-21994 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Small Footprint CIM Broker (SFCB) component as used in VMware ESXi. The vulnerability allows a remote attacker with network access to port 5989 to bypass SFCB authentication by sending a specially crafted request, potentially gaining unauthorized access to management functions exposed by SFCB.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository contains two Python tools and a README documenting a working PoC for CVE-2021-21994 against VMware ESXi SFCB. `sfcb_probe.py` is a research harness with `check` and `fuzz` modes: it builds raw HTTPS CIM-XML POST requests to `/cimom`, validates an authentication oracle, and mutates Authorization/header formatting to discover bypass conditions. It includes low-level TLS socket handling, raw HTTP request construction, response status parsing, and verdict classification based on HTTP status and CIM body presence. `sfcb_exploit.py` is the operational exploit PoC built on top of the probe helpers. It hardcodes the bypass header `Authorization: Basic cm9vdA==` and provides modes to verify the bypass, enumerate class names, enumerate instance names or full instances, inspect methods, invoke methods, and send arbitrary CIM-XML from a file. The exploit capability is unauthenticated access to the ESXi CIM broker for information disclosure, especially host inventory and account enumeration, rather than remote code execution. The README states the root cause: if the Basic auth token does not decode into a `user:password` pair containing `:`, sfcbd skips authentication and forwards the request into the CIMOM. The repository is therefore a real, operational network exploit/PoC for auth bypass and unauthenticated CIM data access on vulnerable ESXi builds.
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