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A vulnerability in the TP-Link Archer A7 AC1750 router firmware version 1.0.15 allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code as root without authentication. The flaw resides in the tdpServer endpoint's improper handling of MAC addresses, where a crafted TCP message can overwrite stack pointers, leading to code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a working exploit for CVE-2021-27246, targeting the TP-Link Archer AC1750 router. The exploit leverages a command injection vulnerability in the TDDP (TP-Link Device Debug Protocol) service running on UDP port 1040. The attack is orchestrated via 'exploit.sh', which launches a local HTTP server to serve the payload ('pwn.sh'), then uses two Python scripts ('tdpwn.py' and 'tddp.py') to interact with the router. 'tdpwn.py' performs an initial association with the router's TDP service on UDP port 20002, simulating multiple OneMesh clients. 'tddp.py' crafts and sends a malicious TDDP packet that injects a command to download and execute 'pwn.sh' from the attacker's HTTP server. The 'pwn.sh' script is a Lua-based reverse shell that listens on TCP port 12345, granting the attacker root access to the router. The exploit is operational and demonstrates remote code execution, requiring the attacker to be on the same network as the target router. The repository is well-structured, with clear separation between the orchestration script, payload, and protocol-specific exploit scripts.
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