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A vulnerability in Gradle (versions 5.1 through 6.x) allows repository content filtering to be bypassed when used within a pluginManagement block in a settings file. This can result in Gradle searching all configured repositories for dependencies, ignoring specified content filters. The issue exposes builds to information disclosure and dependency confusion attacks, as dependency requests may be sent to unintended repositories, potentially leaking internal package names or allowing malicious packages to be resolved.
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buildscript.repositories, which is supported since Gradle 5.1.Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository demonstrates the vulnerability described in CVE-2021-29427, which involves unsafe downloading of plugins in Java-based build tools like Gradle. The core of the repository consists of two Java files: 'VulnerableDownloader.java' and 'SafeDownloader.java'. - 'VulnerableDownloader.java' simulates the vulnerable behavior by downloading a JAR file from an arbitrary URL (defaulting to 'http://untrusted.example.com/plugins/fake-malware.jar') without any validation of the source or file type. This mimics a scenario where an attacker could supply a malicious plugin, leading to potential remote code execution if the JAR is later loaded or executed. - 'SafeDownloader.java' provides a remediated version, restricting downloads to a trusted domain and enforcing a '.jar' file extension check. A shell script ('fix.sh') is included to automate the replacement of the vulnerable file with the safe version, and a GitHub Actions workflow is present for code scanning. The repository is structured as a demonstration and proof-of-concept for the vulnerability, not as a weaponized exploit. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting systems that download and execute plugins from untrusted sources.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.