Loading vulnerability…
A heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in NETGEAR R7000 devices running firmware version 1.0.11.116. The vulnerability is present in the handling of HTTP requests to the backup.cgi endpoint, where a user-supplied length value is trusted during file upload. By crafting a malicious HTTP request with a newline character before the Content-Length header, an attacker can trigger the overflow and execute arbitrary code as root.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module targeting the Netgear R7000 router (firmware version 1.0.11.116) for a pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-31802). The exploit works by sending a series of HTTP requests to manipulate the router's heap state, followed by a specially crafted multipart/form-data POST request to the /genierestore.cgi endpoint. This triggers a heap buffer overflow, resulting in the execution of 'utelnetd -l /bin/sh' on the router, which enables the telnet server. Once enabled, attackers can connect via telnet to the router and obtain a BusyBox shell as the admin user. The module includes logic to check the router model and firmware version, and only attempts exploitation if the target matches the vulnerable configuration. The exploit is operational and provides a working payload, but is not fully weaponized (payload is fixed to enabling telnet). The only file in the repository is a Ruby Metasploit module, and all logic is contained within this file.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.