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D-Link DSL-2750U routers running firmware version ME1.16 or earlier are vulnerable to an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability. An attacker on the local network can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the device. The vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2021-3707 for further exploitation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a working exploit for D-Link DSL-2750U routers running firmware version 1.6, targeting CVE-2021-3707 (TFTP misconfiguration) and CVE-2021-3708 (command injection). The exploit is composed of a Bash script (exploit.sh) and a Python script (exploit.py). The Bash script uploads a crafted configuration file (cfg.xml) to the router via TFTP, exploiting the fact that the TFTP service allows unauthenticated overwrites of the config file. This config file sets a known admin username and password. After waiting for the router to reboot and apply the new configuration, the Python script authenticates to the web interface at http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webproc using the new credentials, then sends a POST request to http://192.168.1.1/cgi-bin/webupg with a malicious 'newmac' parameter to exploit a command injection vulnerability in the 'mac' action. This allows execution of arbitrary commands as root (demonstrated with a reboot command). The repository includes detailed analysis and PoC steps in the README, and is a fully operational exploit for the affected router firmware.
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