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A denial of service vulnerability exists in MDT's firmware for the KNXnet/IP Secure router SCN-IP100.03 and KNX IP interface SCN-IP000.03 prior to version 3.0.4. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted SESSION_REQUEST frame with a modified total length field, causing the device to become unresponsive to all requests on the KNXnet/IP Secure layer until it is rebooted.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2021-37740, a denial of service vulnerability affecting MDT KNXnet/IP Secure router SCN-IP100.03 and interface SCN-IP000.03 running firmware v3.0.3. The exploit is implemented in Python and consists of two main scripts: - `poc.py`: Sends a specially crafted KNXnet/IP Secure SESSION_REQUEST frame with an invalid total length field (0x0259 or higher) to the target device over TCP port 3671. If the device is vulnerable, it becomes unresponsive to further KNXnet/IP Secure frames until rebooted. - `healthcheck.py`: Attempts to initiate a normal KNXnet/IP Secure handshake with the target device to check if it is still responsive. This can be used before and after running the PoC to verify the device's state. The repository also includes a README with detailed instructions, a license file, and standard git configuration files. The exploit targets a network service (KNXnet/IP Secure) and requires the attacker to know the target's IP address and have network access to TCP port 3671. No hardcoded IPs or domains are present; the target is specified at runtime. The exploit is a proof-of-concept and does not provide a weaponized or customizable payload.
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