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CVE-2021-39312 affects the True Ranker WordPress plugin through version 2.2.2. The plugin exposes a file access issue in the file ~/admin/vendor/datatables/examples/resources/examples.php, where user-controlled input supplied via the src parameter is used to access local files without proper path restriction or validation. As a result, an attacker can read arbitrary files from the underlying server filesystem, including sensitive WordPress files such as wp-config.php.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository is a small Python proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2021-39312, an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the WordPress plugin The True Ranker (seo-local-rank) versions 2.2.2 and earlier. The repository contains three files: a README describing the vulnerability and usage, a minimal requirements.txt, and the main exploit script wp.py. The exploit logic in wp.py is straightforward: it accepts a required target base URL (-u/--url) and an optional --payload argument, defaulting to a traversal string aimed at wp-config.php. It constructs a POST request to the vulnerable plugin resource at /wp-content/plugins/seo-local-rank/admin/vendor/datatables/examples/resources/examples.php and sends the parameter src=/scripts/simple.php/<traversal>. If the server responds with HTTP 200, the script writes the returned content to a local file named wp-config.php; otherwise it prints that the site is not vulnerable. Main capability: arbitrary file read from the remote web server, with the default use case being extraction of the WordPress configuration file, which may expose database credentials and other sensitive settings. The exploit is operational but basic: it has a hardcoded default payload and local output filename, with only limited customization via the --payload argument. No shell execution, persistence, or post-exploitation automation is present.
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