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In Sketch versions prior to 75, the application allows library feeds to bypass the macOS file quarantine mechanism. Files from remote sources are automatically downloaded and opened without the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute being set. This enables remote code execution, as an attacker can craft a malicious file (e.g., a terminal profile with a CommandString) that is executed by Terminal.app without user warning.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2021-40531, a macOS quarantine bypass vulnerability in the Sketch design application. The exploit demonstrates how a specially crafted RSS feed (feed.rss) can be used in conjunction with a malicious payload (payload.terminal) to achieve remote code execution on a victim's macOS system. The index.html file provides a web interface that generates a 'sketch://' protocol link, which, when clicked by a user, causes Sketch to fetch and process the malicious feed. The feed references a payload hosted on the attacker's server (typically localhost:8080 for testing), which, when executed, runs arbitrary commands (in this PoC, opens Calculator and kills Terminal). The README provides context and usage notes. The exploit requires the attacker to host the files and entice a victim to add the malicious library, demonstrating a browser-to-local attack vector leveraging Sketch's library import functionality.
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