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CVE-2021-4281 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the .github/workflows/combine-prs.yml workflow file of the Brave UX for-the-badge project. The vulnerability arises from unsafe handling of input within the GitHub Actions workflow, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary OS commands during workflow execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This is an automated research snapshot of BraveUX/for-the-badge at commit 409c1fda3477b8dd05f3289926e08d88edd5a664, primarily a static JavaScript/Gulp website for publishing SVG badges and a browser-side badge generator. Most of the 100 files are benign SVG badge assets. Build logic is contained in gulpfile.js and gulp/tasks/, which compile Pug/Sass/JavaScript, optimize image assets, copy generator assets, and optionally serve dist/ locally on port 8000. The security-relevant artifact is .github/workflows/combine-prs.yml, a manually dispatched GitHub Actions workflow that enumerates matching pull requests, combines their branches, pushes a new branch, and creates a combined PR. It contains script-injection sinks because GitHub Actions expressions are interpolated directly into executable JavaScript: branchPrefix and ignoreLabel are inserted into single-quoted strings in the first actions/github-script block, while an output assembled from attacker-controlled PR titles is interpolated into a JavaScript template literal in the final github-script block. An attacker able to supply malicious workflow input or PR metadata that is processed during a privileged manual workflow run can escape the intended JavaScript context and execute code using the workflow's GitHub API client/token. No CVE identifier or embedded malicious payload is present; the repository is a proof-of-concept research artifact reproducing a GitHub Actions workflow-injection condition.
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