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SuiteCRM versions prior to 7.11.19 are vulnerable to remote code execution due to improper validation of the Log File Name setting in system settings. An attacker with admin access can set the logger_file_name to reference a PHP file under the web root, enabling execution of arbitrary PHP code. The vulnerability arises because the application only blocks all-lowercase PHP file extensions, allowing bypass with mixed-case or uppercase extensions. This is a bypass of the previous fix for CVE-2020-28328.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (suitecrm_log_file_rce.rb) that exploits a remote code execution vulnerability in SuiteCRM (CVE-2021-42840, CVE-2020-28328) affecting versions up to 7.11.18. The exploit abuses improper input validation on the log file extension parameter, allowing an attacker to create a log file with a .php extension. By changing the username of a valid user (which is logged), the attacker injects PHP code into the log file. The attacker then triggers execution of this code by sending an HTTP request to the log file, resulting in remote code execution as the web server user. The module supports both Meterpreter and bash reverse shell payloads, and requires valid SuiteCRM administrative credentials. The attack is performed over HTTP(S), and the module includes options for restoring the configuration file and cleaning up artifacts. The code is written in Ruby and is fully integrated into the Metasploit framework, making it a weaponized exploit.
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