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In Apache APISIX before version 2.10.2, the uri-block plugin uses the $request_uri variable without normalization or verification. $request_uri contains the full original request URI, which can include non-normalized forms such as double slashes. This allows attackers to craft URIs that bypass block list rules, for example, using //internal/ to bypass a block list entry for ^/internal/. This issue may also affect other plugins and custom plugins that rely on $request_uri for access control.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (POC) exploit demonstrating a path traversal vulnerability in Apache APISIX (v0.7.2) when deployed in a Kubernetes environment. The repository contains deployment files for two Flask-based microservices ('public-service' and 'protected-service'), their Dockerfiles, and APISIX route configurations. The 'protected-service' endpoint is intended to be blocked by the APISIX 'uri-blocker' plugin, but the exploit demonstrates that by using encoded (..%2F) or relative (../) path traversal sequences in the URL, an attacker can bypass the access control and access the protected endpoint. The main exploit is performed via crafted HTTP requests (using curl) to the APISIX gateway. The repository includes a shell script (apisix_request.sh) to facilitate sending these requests. The structure is typical for a POC: infrastructure-as-code files (YAML), minimal Python web services, and documentation describing setup and exploitation steps. No detection scripts or fake exploits are present; the repository is focused on demonstrating the vulnerability.
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