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CVE-2021-44168 is an improper integrity-validation vulnerability in the FortiOS "execute restore src-vis" command before version 7.0.3. Specially crafted update packages can cause the command to download arbitrary files on the device because downloaded code is not integrity checked.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides an exploit for CVE-2021-44168, a vulnerability in Fortinet FortiGate firewalls (<= 7.0.2) that allows for arbitrary file write via a crafted source visibility signature package. The exploit consists of a C program ('gen_src-vis_pkg_file.c') that generates a malicious package file (e.g., 'pwn.img') by embedding a tarball ('pwn.tar') with directory traversal paths. When this package is restored on a vulnerable FortiGate device (using the CLI and a TFTP server, e.g., 'execute restore src-vis tftp pwn.img 192.168.100.1'), the payload is extracted and a shell is dropped on the device. The shell is accessible via LD_PRELOAD tricks when running certain CLI commands, granting root access. The repository includes a test tarball ('test.tar') for benign testing, and the README provides detailed usage instructions. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring the attacker to upload the malicious package to the device. Key fingerprintable endpoints include the files '/etc/cid.tar.gz', 'test.tar', 'pwn.tar', and the TFTP server IP '192.168.100.1'. The exploit is operational, providing a working payload and clear instructions for use.
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