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HighExploited in the wildCISA KEVPublic exploitVulnerability

CVE-2022-22706: Read-only memory write and privilege escalation in Arm Mali GPU Kernel Driver

Published Mar 3, 2022 · Updated 29 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days14 mentions · peak 14 in a dayToday
CVSS7.8High · v3.1
EPSS1.6%76th percentile
CISA KEVYesAdded Mar 30, 2023
In the wildActivePer CISA KEV
Vendor
ARM Holdings
IdentifiersCVE-2022-22706CWE-119 · Improper Restriction of Operations…

CVE-2022-22706 is a vulnerability in the Arm Mali GPU Kernel Driver that allows a local non-privileged user to write to read-only memory pages. Incorrect handling of CPU and GPU write-permission flags in kbase_jd_user_buf_pin_pages() permits GPU writes to pages that should remain read-only. Affected versions are Midgard r26p0 through r31p0, Bifrost r0p0 through r35p0, and Valhall r19p0 through r35p0. Attackers can modify cached file-backed pages, including shared-library code used by privileged processes, enabling privilege escalation. The issue was also reported as CVE-2021-39793, and Arm has acknowledged evidence of limited, targeted exploitation.

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Analyst brief

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means and what to do now: patch path, interim mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Unauthorized modification of read-only file-backed pages can compromise code executed by other processes without changing the underlying files on disk. On affected Android devices, this primitive can enable code injection into privileged services and escalation to system or root privileges. Demonstrated exploit chains have additionally achieved kernel-module execution and disabled SELinux, although these outcomes depend on device-specific permissions and additional exploitation steps. Successful exploitation can compromise device confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Where operationally feasible, restrict untrusted applications and users from accessing the Mali GPU device through device permissions and SELinux policy. Such restrictions may affect graphics functionality and require platform-level changes. Limit installation and execution of untrusted applications to reduce local attack opportunities. These measures are temporary risk reductions, not substitutes for a patched driver.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Install device-vendor firmware or kernel updates incorporating Arm's fixes. The fixed driver releases are Midgard r32p0 and Bifrost/Valhall r36p0; use these or later applicable releases containing the fix. Device manufacturers must integrate the corrected kernel driver into shipped firmware; updating applications or browser software alone does not remediate this driver vulnerability.

Public exploits

Exploits

3 exploits validated by Mallory's analysis. Hidden: 1 not yet analyzed, such as Exploit-DB entries.

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CVE-2022-22706-pocThis repository is a compact local privilege-escalation proof of concept for CVE-2022-22706. It contains two files: a README explaining the vulnerability, exploit flow, build/run steps, and references; and a single C source file implementing the exploit. The exploit targets a flaw in the Arm Mali kbase driver where imported user pages can be pinned without write semantics while still being remapped back to userspace as CPU-writable. By importing an anonymous writable page, then replacing that virtual address with a MAP_SHARED read-only mapping of /etc/passwd before the driver pins it during JOB_SUBMIT, the exploit obtains a writable alias to the page-cache page backing /etc/passwd. It then performs a length-preserving overwrite of the root account line from 'root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh' to 'root::0:0:rootx:/root:/bin/sh', making root appear to have an empty password in cached reads. After verifying the cached modification, it completes the pending soft event, cleans up mappings, and execs '/bin/su root' to gain a root shell. The exploit is not network-based, does not include a reverse shell or remote payload, and is a real operational local exploit rather than a detector. Its main capability is page-cache-only file content corruption leading to privilege escalation, with persistence limited to the lifetime of the cached page.byt3quester · Disclosed Jul 31, 2026 · c · markdown · localOperationalvivo-y70s-temp-rootThis standalone repository contains a device-specific CVE-2022-22706 privilege-escalation chain, rather than a scanner or framework module. The supplied inventory reports 47 files, including 22 code files: seven Python files, nine shell scripts, four Windows batch launchers, one PowerShell build script, and one C source file. The C helper exploits Mali user-memory import and delayed page-pinning permissions to obtain a CPU-writable alias of otherwise read-only file-cache pages. It targets the Android linker instead of directly modifying kernel credentials or resolving commit_creds/prepare_kernel_cred. A guarded AArch64 stub is placed in validated zero padding, and the linker entry is redirected temporarily. Starting the existing root-owned dumpstatez service then executes the shell payload with that service's identity. Device scripts restore the original entry before clearing the stub and verify the complete linker hash, leaving the already-started root daemon running. The root-switch directory supplies the public ADB controller, private-device enrollment, pinned manifest, device lifecycle/recovery scripts, shell payloads, Windows launchers, and 13 described unit tests. The controller implements host/device locking, identity and hash checks, bounded retries, unsafe-state refusal, application-configuration comparisons, and fresh root probes. archive/windows preserves historical tooling; tools provides build-only and offline-verification utilities; docs explains the mechanism and limitations; evidence contains selected historical identity and restoration records; third_party contains Zig/musl notices. The daemon executes a writable local command file and logs results; it is not a reverse shell or network listener. Network ADB is merely an optional pre-existing transport, and the only explicit IP endpoint is a mocked documentation address in a unit test. Documentation URLs are background/build references, not runtime callbacks. No exfiltration endpoint, boot persistence, root hiding, bootloader modification, or SELinux disabling is evident. The shared command mailbox lacks per-application authorization, and malformed linker modification can disrupt process execution. Included historical records report UID 0 in u:r:dumpstate:s0 on October 17 and November 8, 2026, with successful linker restoration. These are supplied artifacts, not independently reproduced results. Publication checks explicitly report no phone connection and no hardware validation of the rebuilt helper. Both controller files and substantial portions of the C source are truncated in the provided material. The inventory omits the helper binary and two binary reference assets that documentation and SHA256SUMS say are distributed, so their actual availability cannot be confirmed here. No repository URL, git reference, archive path, or archive byte size was supplied; empty repository strings and size 0 represent unavailable metadata.hrx114514x · Disclosed Nov 18, 2026 · c · python · local · usb · networkOperationalsony-bravia-mtk-rootStandalone rooting and customization research repository containing 100 listed files, including 32 source/build-script files. debloat/ contains reversible ADB package-removal scripts and package lists; launcher/ contains a Kotlin Android TV home screen, resources, and Gradle configuration. root-research/ holds platform findings and a nested Sony-XBR-65X850D research tree containing C/JNI exploits, a Java console APK, ARM/Thumb payloads, PowerShell/Python build tools, and extensive device, Binder, kernel, and init-service reports. No original repository URL, git reference, or archive size was supplied; the empty metadata and zero size indicate unavailable information. The operational chain uses CVE-2022-22706 to obtain a writable alias of read-only file page-cache pages through Mali imported-buffer permission inconsistencies. It patches libc's setresuid path so one application retains UID 0, then serves authenticated shell commands on wildcard TCP port 4445. pcwrite3 adds per-core cache maintenance important to the documented MT5891 port. A separate dumpstate library-constructor payload launches a root script. These are local privilege-escalation techniques; ADB TCP is the deployment channel and the console is post-exploitation access, not evidence of unauthenticated network compromise. No external exfiltration or callback destination is evident in the supplied exploit code. Important limitations: SELinux confinement remains intact, and RAM patches disappear on reboot or potentially page-cache eviction. The upstream APK includes automatic reapplication machinery, but the top-level MT5891 results explicitly report no persistent root. The default JNI source still contains upstream UID/offset assumptions, so the documented successful port is not equivalent to running the bundled APK unchanged. Older playbook statements and newer success reports conflict; the advertised tools/tv-root.sh helper is absent from the supplied inventory. CVE-2023-4211 research reports a constrained UAF atomic-write primitive, not completed arbitrary kernel read/write. The endgame requires an external physical-memory harness and its supplied weak stubs fail closed. CVE-2022-20186/CVE-2022-28348 alias-overflow probes are experimental, and CVE-2021-28663 attempts are subsequently reported inapplicable on this driver. Incorrect hooks caused documented crash loops; claims that RAM-only changes are inherently harmless should not be accepted. Several large files are truncated, so buildability and all claimed on-device outcomes were not independently verified.emdzej · Disclosed Nov 20, 2026 · c · java · local · networkOperational
Exposure surface

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
ARM HoldingsBifrost Gpu Kernel Driverapplication
ARM HoldingsMidgard Gpu Kernel Driverapplication
ARM HoldingsValhall Gpu Kernel Driverapplication
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is CVE-2022-22706 exploited in the wild?
Yes. As of Oct 25, 2026, Mallory has reports of exploitation in the wild, and CISA added it to KEV on Mar 30, 2023.
Is there a public exploit for CVE-2022-22706?
Yes. Mallory tracks 3 public exploits or proofs of concept for CVE-2022-22706, the earliest disclosed Jul 31, 2026.
Is there a patch for CVE-2022-22706?
Install device-vendor firmware or kernel updates incorporating Arm's fixes. The fixed driver releases are Midgard r32p0 and Bifrost/Valhall r36p0; use these or later applicable releases containing the fix.
What products are affected by CVE-2022-22706?
ARM Holdings Bifrost Gpu Kernel Driver, ARM Holdings Midgard Gpu Kernel Driver, and ARM Holdings Valhall Gpu Kernel Driver.
How severe is CVE-2022-22706?
CVE-2022-22706 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 7.8 (High) and an EPSS score of 1.6% (76th percentile) as of Oct 25, 2026.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, and which detections to deploy tonight.
Exposure mappingQuery your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Threat actor evidence1Every report linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Associated malware2Malware families linked to this CVE, with evidence and IOCs.
Detection signatures1YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Vendor-by-vendor mappingCross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Social activity14Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.